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WE ST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
open to collateral attack. Held, that while P is not a de facta cor-
poration and cannot continue to do business under the corporate
guise, the winding up of corporate affairs is not "doing business";
and that for the purposes of this suit collateral attack against the
corporate existence will be denied. Peora Coal Co. v. Ashcraft.1
"De facto" is not a term used to designate a legal entity as
is the term "de jure", but is used rather to describe a result arising
when for some reason collateral attack is denied against an imper-
fectly formed corporation or a corporation whose corporate exist-
ence has been forfeited or has expired.2 Under the general rule,
upon expiration or revocation of the corporate charter, there can
be no de facto corporation; and collateral attack against the exist-
ence of the corporation is allowed' unless prevented by a statute.4
Such statutes are generally so worded as to allow a corporation,
whose charter has expired, to wind up their corporate affairs, but
not to carry on any further business.' These statutes have been
construed as intending to enable the dissolved corporation to wind
up its affairs without the intervention of a receiver. 6 Such a statute,
enabling a dissolved corporation to sue in its own name, exists in
West Virginia,' but in the instant case a special receiver had been
appointed by the court; and it would seem that the suit should
117 S. E. (2d) 444 (AV. Va. 1941).
2 STEVEXS, CoEaRATIoNS (1936) 121: "When incorporation is so defective
that it is subject to successful attack in a direct proceeding by the state and yet
not open to collateral attack in private litigation or even in suits to which the
state is a party, for reasons other than those of pure estoppel, it is said that
there is a de facto corporation. To say that there is a de facto corporation is
to say merely that, in the particular litigation, the application of the de facto
doctrine calls for a denial of collateral attack upon the corporate personality
of the associates even though they have failed to perfect incorporation.' I The
theory that the term "de facto" denotes a result is generally accepted. The
term does not mean a corporation in fact, but signifies the legal effect attributed
to certain facts. It is respectfully submitted that the court's definition, that
a do facto corporation is a perfect corporation with all its powers except strict
legality of existence, which can be questioned only by the state, is not wholly
correct. For a more complete definition and classification of do facto corpo-
rations see WArEN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION (1929)
683 et seq.
3 Supreme Lodge, K. of P. v. Weller, 93 Va. 605, 25 S. E. 891 (1896);
Greely v. Smith, 3 Storey 657, Fed. Case No. 5748 (1845); Sturges v. Vander-
bilt, 73 N. Y. 384 (1878).
4 Sturges v. Vanderbilt, 73 N. Y. 384 (1878).
5See VA. CODE (Michie, 1936) c. 147, § 3810; Bache v. Louisiana Oil Re-
fining Corp., 97 F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) aff'g 20 F. Supp. 580 (W. D.
La. 1938).
3 M. H. McCarthy Co. v. Dubuque Dist. Court, 201 Iowa 912, 208 N. W. 505
(1926); Von Glahn v. De Russet, 81 N. C. 467 (1879).
7 W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 31, art. 1, § 83.
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have been instituted by the receiver.8 The retiring of the case from
the docket will offer no obstacle to such procedure, since the recent
case of Largent v. Bouchelle9 allows the receiver to continue liquida-
tion even after the deliquent taxes have been paid.
The case of M iler v. Newburg Coal Co.,10 cannot be relied
upon as authority for holding that a corporation whose charter is
forfeited for nonpayment of taxes may continue to do business as
a de facto corporation, since in that case the defendant was not
allowed to use the expiration of its charter as a defense because,
having held itself out to be a corporation, it was estopped to deny
it.11
Considering, then, the general rule and the statute purporting
to change the rule, it would seem that the statute should not ex-
tend further than to allow a dissolved corporation to sue and be
sued in its own name where the charter has expired or there has
been a voluntary dissolution. The circumstances under which the
corporation in the instant case was dissolved differs greatly from
voluntary dissolution or expiration of a charter. Here a corpo-
ration failed to pay taxes needed for the maintenance of the gov-
ernment under which it was created. In view of the clear publie
policy against such failure to pay expressed by the legislature,"2
it is submitted that no consideration should be given such a corpo-
ration.
W. H. S.
s Whether W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 31, art. 1, § 83, applies to a corpo-
ration dissolved for nonpayment of taxes is a debatable question. This provi-
sion, by its language, pertains to dissolved corporations 'as prescribed in
this article". The article touches only upon voluntary dissolution and expira-
tion of the corporate charter, but the first section of c. 31, art. 1 provides:
"Except as therein otherwise provided, the sections of this article shall become
and be effective from the date fixed in the act of the Legislature adopting the
same, and the provisions thereof shall apply to and govern all corporations then
existing or thereafter formed and all corporate acts thereafter done." How-
ever, regardless of the above question, section 82 of the same article sets up the
machinery for the appointment of a special receiver. The aforesaid section 83
was enacted to allow corporations, otherwise prevented from doing so, to wind
up their affairs. Thus, after the appointment of the special receiver, it would
seem that the provisions of section 83 are no longer necessary.
9120 W. Va. 364, 198 S. E. 148 (1938). This important decision was not
mentioned in the opinion of the instant case.
10 31 W. Va. 836, 8 S. E. 600, 13 Am. St. Rep. 903 (1888).
-"WARREN, op. cit. supra n. 2, at 839.
12 . VA. CODE (Michie Supp. 1941) c. 11A, art. 3, § 1.
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